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INTRODUCTION
The United States is an outlier among democratic countries when it comes to
the institutions charged with running our elections. Most other democratic
countries have an independent election authority with some insulation from
partisan politics.1 In the United States, by contrast, partisan election administration2 is the near-universal norm among the states. Most states’ chief election

* Robert M. Duncan/Jones Day Designated Professor of Law, The Ohio State University, Moritz
College of Law. The author thanks David Adamany, Sam Issacharoff, Kevin Kennedy, and Justin
Levitt for their comments on earlier drafts and Tim Myers for his excellent research assistance.
1. See INT’L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY & ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, INTERNATIONAL
ELECTORAL STANDARDS: GUIDELINES FOR REVIEWING THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ELECTIONS
37 (2002), available at http://www.idea.int/publications/ies/index.cfm; RAPHAEL LÓPEZ-PINTOR,
ELECTORAL MANAGEMENT BODIES AS INSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNANCE 12 (2000), available at
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/democratic-governance/electoral_systems
andprocesses/electoral-management-bodies-as-institutions-of-governance.html; LOUIS MASSICOTTE
ET AL., ESTABLISHING THE RULES OF THE GAME: ELECTION LAWS IN DEMOCRACIES 83–97
(2004); Olivier Ihl, Electoral Administration, in ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF EUROPEAN ELECTIONS 87, 87–89
(Yves Déloye & Michael Bruter eds., 2007); see also infra notes 60–70 and accompanying text.
2. This Article uses the terms “partisan election administration,” “bipartisan election
administration,” and “nonpartisan election administration” to refer to the manner in which chief
election authorities are chosen. Thus, “partisan election administration” includes chief election
officials who are elected in partisan elections, as well as those who are appointed by party-affiliated
elected officials. “Bipartisan election administration” refers to bodies containing representatives from
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officials—usually the secretary of state—are elected to office as nominees of their
parties, while almost all the remaining states’ chief election authorities are
appointed by partisan actors.3 There is greater variation at the local level, but it is
common for county and municipal election officials to be party-affiliated as well.4
While there have been major changes in U.S. election administration since 2000,
the partisanship of those responsible for running elections remains largely
unchanged. The United States has some experience with nonpartisan electoral
institutions in other contexts, including redistricting and campaign finance, but we
have very little experience with nonpartisan election administration at the state
level.5
There is one conspicuous exception to the partisan character of state election
administration: Wisconsin’s Government Accountability Board (GAB). Established by the Wisconsin state legislature in 2007, the GAB has responsibility for
election administration, as well as enforcement of campaign finance, ethics, and
lobbying laws.6 Its members are former judges chosen in a manner that is designed
to ensure that they will not favor either major party.7 This makes the GAB unique
among state election administration bodies in the United States. While there are
other examples of putatively nonpartisan state entities responsible for enforcement of campaign finance, lobbying, and ethics rules,8 no other state has a chief
election administration authority with the same degree of insulation from partisan
politics. In our age of hyperpolarized politics—of which Wisconsin has lately been
a leading example—it is an open question whether such a nonpartisan institution
can function effectively. With heated allegations of voter suppression coming
from one side and equally heated allegations of voter fraud from the other, it has
become difficult even to discuss the most important election administration
two or more parties. “Nonpartisan election administration” refers to entities or persons selected in a
way that is designed to make them independent of partisan politics.
3. Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election Administration to Avoid
Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 974 (2005); Daniel P. Tokaji, The Future of Election
Reform: From Rules to Institutions, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 125, 131–32 (2009).
4. David C. Kimball, Martha Kropf & Lindsay Battles, Helping America Vote? Election
Administration, Partisanship, and Provisional Voting in the 2004 Election, 5 ELECTION L.J. 447, 453 (2006);
see also David C. Kimball & Martha Kropf, The Street-Level Bureaucrats of Elections: Selection Methods for
Local Election Officials, 23 REV. POL’Y RES. 1257, 1262 tbl.4 (2006) (showing methods of selection in
4500 local electoral jurisdictions).
5. This Article uses the term “election administration” to refer to nuts-and-bolts mechanics of
running elections, including the administration of rules regarding voter registration, voter
identification, absentee and early voting, recounts, access to the ballot, and direct democracy. This
corresponds to the areas of responsibility delegated to the GAB’s Elections Division under state law.
WIS. STAT. § 5.05(2w) (2012). As used in this Article, the term “election administration” does not
include other topics such as campaign finance, lobbying, and ethics. As explained later, another
division of the GAB (the Ethics and Accountability Division) has responsibilities in these other areas.
6. See id. § 5.05(1) (2012) (granting the GAB power to administer laws relating to elections and
election campaigns).
7. See infra notes 24–26, 28 and accompanying text.
8. See infra Table 1.
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questions of the day civilly—much less to run elections in a manner that
engenders public confidence.9
Is there any hope for nonpartisan election administration in an era of intense
political polarization?10 This Article considers this question by examining and
assessing the performance of Wisconsin’s GAB during its first five years of
existence. I conclude that the GAB has been successful in administering elections
evenhandedly and that it serves as a worthy model for other states considering
alternatives to partisan election administration at the state level. Part I discusses
the origins and history of the GAB, putting it in the context of other electoral
institutions in the United States, as well as electoral institutions in other
democratic countries. Part II discusses the most important election administration
issues that have come before the Wisconsin GAB since its creation in 2007. As
this discussion reveals, these years have been an exceptionally contentious period
of time for Wisconsin. The state has seen fiercely partisan debates over such issues
as voter registration and voter identification, errant reporting of election results in
a very close state supreme court race, and contentious recall elections of the
governor and prominent state legislators. Although the GAB did little to create
these controversies, they have tested its nonpartisan structure. The Article
concludes by evaluating the GAB’s performance during these trying times and
considering whether the Wisconsin model should be exported to other states.
I. THE WISCONSIN MODEL
The GAB was created by statute (Act 1) in 2007.11 Through this legislation,
the functions of two previously existing boards were unified under the GAB: (1)
the State Elections Board, which was responsible for election administration and
campaign finance, and (2) the State Ethics Board, which enforced lobbying and
ethics rules.12 The 2007 statute abolished these boards effective 2008, transferring
all their functions to the GAB.13
The main impetus for creation of the GAB was not a perceived need to
reform the administration of elections. Instead, it was the view that the preexisting
boards “had been too lax in their enforcement of campaign finance, ethics, and

9. See generally RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS: FROM FLORIDA 2000 TO THE NEXT
ELECTION MELTDOWN (2012) (detailing the increase in election-related litigation and allegations of
partisanship in election administration).
10. For an enlightening discussion of the causes of political polarization in the United States,
see Richard Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99
CALIF. L. REV. 293 (2011).
11. 2007 Wisconsin Act 1, WIS. STAT. § 5.05 (2010).
12. See STEVEN F. HUEFNER, DANIEL P. TOKAJI & EDWARD B. FOLEY, FROM
REGISTRATION TO RECOUNTS: THE ELECTION ECOSYSTEMS OF FIVE MIDWESTERN STATES 115–
17 (2007).
13. Id.
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lobbying laws.”14 The legislature, as well as good government groups, also thought
it advisable to place control over all these subjects under a single entity.15
Previously, the State Elections Board enforced campaign finance laws while the
State Ethics Board enforced ethics and lobbying laws.16 While election
administration was not exactly an afterthought, it was not the primary
consideration that motivated the legislature to create the GAB.17 The bill passed
with broad bipartisan support: no Republicans and just two Democrats opposed
it.18
One of the most important changes accomplished by Act 1 was to place
responsibility for all these subjects under the control of a nonpartisan rather than
a bipartisan body. The State Elections Board, which oversaw election
administration until 2008, was a bipartisan board consisting of eight members.19
One member was appointed by each of the following officials: (1) the chief justice
of the state supreme court; (2) the governor; (3) the majority leader of the state
senate; (4) the minority leader of the state senate; (5) the speaker of the state
assembly; (6) the minority leader of the state assembly; (7) the chair of the
Democratic Party; and (8) the chair of the Republican Party.20 In effect, control
over the board hinged on the appointees of the governor and chief justice and, at
various times, the State Election Board had an effective majority of either
Democrats or Republicans. The State Ethics Board consisted of six members,21
nominated by the governor with the advice and consent of the state senate.22
Although its members could not be affiliated with a party, this did not provide
much of a check on political influence.23
A critical ingredient of the GAB is the method by which its board members
are selected. All six members of the GAB must be former judges.24 The names of
potential board members are put forward by a candidate committee, consisting of
one court of appeals judge from each of the four districts.25 All members of the

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 115.
Id. at 117.
Id.
Id.
Tom Tolan, Nonpartisan Government Accountability Board Faces Partisan Charges, MILWAUKEE
J. SENTINEL (June 7, 2011), http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/123419369.html..
19. HUEFNER ET AL., supra note 12, at 115.
20. Id. Parties were qualified to select a member of the board if they obtained at least ten
percent of the vote in the most recent gubernatorial election. WIS. STAT. § 15.61 (repealed 2007).
Between 2002 and 2007, the State Elections Board also had a Libertarian Party designate. HUEFNER
ET AL., supra note 12, at 128 n.23.
21. WIS. STAT. § 15.62 (repealed effective 2008).
22. Id. § 15.07(1)(a) (repealed 2007).
23. Christian M. Sande, Where Perception Meets Reality: The Elusive Goal of Impartial Election
Oversight, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 729, 746 (2008).
24. WIS. STAT. § 15.60 (2012).
25. Id. §§ 5.052, 15.60(2) (2012).
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board are nominated by the governor.26 Of the initial six seats on the GAB, three
were to be confirmed by the state senate and three by the state assembly on a
majority vote.27 Because the state senate was at the time controlled by Democrats
and the state assembly by Republicans, this effectively gave each party
confirmation power over three members of the original GAB. Subsequent
members of the board must, by statute, be confirmed by a two-thirds vote of the
state senate28—a provision designed to ensure bipartisan consensus and therefore
moderation in the board members actually chosen. All decisions of the board
must receive approval from at least four of the six GAB members.29
Board members serve staggered six-year terms, with one member’s term
expiring each year.30 A total of nine people served on the board between 2007 and
2012.31 While GAB members are prohibited from engaging in certain political
activities, like being a candidate for office or a member of a party, people who
have engaged in political activities in the past are not prohibited from serving on
the board.32 Three members of the board sitting in 2013 were previously elected
to office as Republicans and one as a Democrat.33 The others had not been
elected to partisan office before joining the board.34 As of August 2013, five of the
six members of the GAB were originally appointed by former Democratic
Governor Jim Doyle.35 Republican Governor Scott Walker has appointed one
additional member and reappointed two of the original members, though none of
these appointees has been confirmed to date.36
By statute, the GAB is divided into two divisions: (1) the Ethics and
Accountability Division, responsible for enforcement of campaign finance, ethics,
and lobbying laws, and (2) the Elections Division, responsible for election

26. Id. § 15.07(1)(a)(2) (2012).
27. 2007 Wisconsin Act 1 § 209(4), 2007 Wis. Sess. Laws 1, 26.
28. WIS. STAT. § 15.07(1)(a)(2).
29. Id. § 5.05(1e) (2012).
30. Id. § 15.06(1)(a) (2012).
31. See Members of the Government Accountability Board, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY BOARD ST. OF
WIS., http://gab.wi.gov/about/members (last visited Feb. 16, 2013) (listing six current board
members); Past Members of the Government Accountability Board, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY BOARD ST. OF
WIS., http://gab.wi.gov/about/members/past (last visited Feb. 16, 2013) (listing three past board
members).
32. WIS. STAT. § 15.60 (2012).
33. Tom Tolan, Walker Appoints Judge to Government Accountability Board, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, June 17, 2011, at 2B.
34. Tolan, supra note 18.
35. Judge David G. Deininger, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY BOARD ST. OF WIS., http://gab.wi
.gov/about/members/deininger; Judge Gerald C. Nichol, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY BOARD ST. OF
WIS., http://gab.wi.gov/about/members/nichol; Judge Michael Brennan, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
BOARD ST. OF WIS., http://gab.wi.gov/about/members/brennan; Judge Thomas Barland, GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY BOARD ST. OF WIS., http://gab.wi.gov/about/members/barland; Judge Thomas
Cane, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY BOARD ST. OF WIS., http://gab.wi.gov/about/members/cane.
36. Judge David G. Deininger, supra note 35; Judge Gerald C. Nichol, supra note 35; Judge Timothy L.
Vocke, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY BOARD ST. OF WIS., http://gab.wi.gov/about/members/vocke.
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administration.37 It is also statutorily required to employ a legal counsel to
“perform legal and administrative functions for the board”38 and to designate a
board employee as “the chief election official” of the state.39 Kevin Kennedy has
served as the director and legal counsel of the GAB since its inception.40 He had
previously served for many years as executive director of the State Elections
Board.41 The Ethics and Accountability Division and the Elections Division each
have their own division administrator, who reports to the director and legal
counsel.42 They and all other staff of the GAB, like the board members, are
required to refrain from specified political activities.43
The statute creating the GAB gives it various powers and duties with respect
to the enforcement of state election administration, campaign finance, lobbying,
and ethics laws. Any person who believes there to be a violation of laws within the
GAB’s enforcement jurisdiction may file a complaint with the board. Its powers
include the investigation of alleged violations (with subpoena power),44 the
bringing of legal actions to enforce state laws,45 the referral of matters involving
criminal conduct for prosecution,46 and the promulgation of rules interpreting or
implementing state election laws.47 It may also issue advisory opinions on legal
matters within its jurisdiction.48 With respect to election administration, the GAB
has the power to provide financial assistance to counties and to conduct
educational programs for voters.49 It is also charged with responsibility for the
state voter registration list, and for establishing and enforcing procedures that
local jurisdictions must follow in maintaining the list.50
Even before the creation of the GAB, Wisconsin’s State Elections Board had
a reputation for evenhandedness and professionalism in its administration of
election laws.51 This was true despite the fact that, as noted above, it was
controlled by one or the other major party at various times. The GAB’s structure
adds a level of insulation from partisan politics greater than what either the
Elections Board or the Ethics Board enjoyed before. This is ensured both by the
37. WIS. STAT. §§ 5.05(2s)–5.05(2w) (2012).
38. Id. § 5.05(1m) (2012).
39. Id. § 5.05(3g) (2012).
40. Accountability Board Names Chief Counsel, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 6, 2007, at 2B.
41. HUEFNER ET AL., supra note 12, at 115.
42. Id. at 116.
43. WIS. STAT. § 5.05(2m)(d)–(e) (2012).
44. Id. § 5.05(1)(b).
45. Id. § 5.05(1)(c).
46. Id. § 5.05(2m)(a).
47. Id. § 5.05(1)(f).
48. Id. § 5.05(6a).
49. Id. § 5.05(6a)(11) & (12).
50. Id. § 5.05(15).
51. STEVEN F. HUEFNER, NATHAN A. CEMENSKA, DANIEL P. TOKAJI & EDWARD B.
FOLEY, FROM REGISTRATION TO RECOUNTS REVISITED 43 (2011). The Elections Board’s staff was
required to be nonpartisan. WIS. STAT. § 5.05(4) (2005).
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means of appointment—specifically, the requirement of confirmation by a twothirds supermajority in the state senate52—and by the provision that the governor
may only remove members for cause.53 The fact that the GAB is composed of
former judges, who are less likely to have an incentive to make decisions with an
eye toward securing some future position, also helps provide some insulation to
the board’s decision making. To be sure, this structure does not guarantee that the
GAB’s decisions will be free of partisan bias. But it does increase the likelihood of
having politically neutral board members while reducing the likelihood that they
will cater to either major party.
In this respect, the GAB is unique among state chief election authorities. As
summarized in the table below, the predominant mode of selecting state chief
election authorities in the United States is through partisan election. This is the
manner in which thirty-five states select their chief election official, usually the
secretary of state.54 In the other states, the state chief election authority—either an
individual or a multimember board—is appointed.
Table 1: State Chief Election Authorities
Partisan
elected
official
AL, AK, AZ,
AR*, CA, CO,
CT, GA, ID,
IN*, IA, KS,
KY*, LA, MA,
MI, MN, MS,
MO, MT, ME,
NE, NH, NV,
NM, ND, OH,
OR, RI*, SD*,
UT, VT, WA,
WV, WY

Individual
Appointed Appointed
by governor by legislature
DE, FL,
NJ, PA,
TX

TN

Multimember board
Bipartisan:
Bipartisan: Nonpartisan
One party
Equal no. of
controls
Ds and Rs
AR*, HI,
IL, IN*, NY
WI
KY*, MD,
NC, OK,
RI*, SC,
SD*,VA

* These states are listed twice because state election administration authority is shared by a partisan
secretary of state and a bipartisan board.

52.
53.
54.

WIS. STAT. §§ 15.07(1)(a).
Id. § 17.07(3) (2012).
Hasen, supra note 3, at 974–76; see also CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & ELECTION MGMT.,
ELECTION ADMINISTRATION PROFILES OF ALL FIFTY STATES (2009) (explaining oversight of
election management in states). The information in the remainder of this paragraph and Table 1 is
based on these sources, supplemented by my own review of state laws.
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Of the states with an appointed chief election authority, six have an individual
serving as state chief election authority, while fourteen states (including
Wisconsin) have a multiperson board.55 Of the states with an appointed individual,
five vest the governor with appointment authority (sometimes subject to
legislative confirmation, but not by a supermajority), and the remaining state
(Tennessee) gives the state legislature the power to appoint the secretary of state.56
Of the fourteen states with appointed boards, ten have a board that is structured
(either formally or functionally) so that a majority of members are of one party;
the other three have an equal number of Republicans and Democrats. While a
board with an equal number of Republicans and Democrats may seem more fair
than a partisan secretary of state, that model introduces the problem of gridlock
with respect to controversial decisions.57
The predominant models of running elections are problematic, given the
inherent conflicts of interest they create for state chief election authorities.
Specifically, there is a conflict between their obligation to the citizenry to
discharge their duties without partisan bias on the one hand, and their incentive to
make decisions that benefit their party on the other.58 This problem has arisen in
several highly publicized elections, including the conduct of Republican Secretaries
of State Katherine Harris and Ken Blackwell during the 2000 Florida and 2004
Ohio presidential elections, respectively, the conduct of Democratic Secretaries of
State Mark Ritchie of Minnesota and Jennifer Brunner of Ohio in 2008, and
Ohio’s Republican Secretary of State Jon Husted in 2012. In all these cases, the
state’s chief election official has been criticized by leaders of the other major party
for acting in a partisan manner.59 Partisan motivation is inherently difficult to

55. The careful reader will note that the sum of states with elected and appointed chief
election authorities exceeds fifty. That is because, in five states (Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky, Rhode
Island, South Dakota) an appointed board shares election administration responsibility with the
elected secretary of state. In South Dakota, the elected secretary of state is a member of the board and
the other six members are appointed.
56. TENN. CONST. art III, § 17. Tennessee’s chief administrative election official is actually
the state coordinator of elections, who is chosen by the appointed secretary of state. TENN. CODE
ANN. § 2-11-201 (2012). Tennessee also has a State Election Commission, consisting of seven
members, id. § 2-11-101, selected by the state legislature. Id. § 2-11-104. I have not listed it as a
“board” state, however, because its primary duties are to appoint and remove local election
commissioners. See About the State Election Committee, TENN. DEPARTMENT OF ST. ELECTIONS,
http://www.tn.gov/sos/election/statecom.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2013).
57. The gridlock is particularly evident in the inaction of Illinois’s bipartisan Board of
Elections. When asked to describe the board, one longtime participant in Illinois politics said “[they
don’t] try to get too far out in front of anything.” David C Kimball, Illinois: Ending the Gridlock, in
ELECTION REFORM: POLITICS AND POLICY 190, 194 (Daniel J. Palazzolo & James W. Ceaser eds.,
2005); see also HUEFNER ET AL., supra note 12, at 63.
58. See generally Daniel P. Tokaji, Lowenstein Contra Lowenstein: Conflicts of Interest in Election
Administration, 9 ELECTION L.J. 421 (2010) (arguing that conflicts of interest are a central problem in
American election administration).
59. Id. at 432; Massimo Calabresi, The Powerful Official Behind Ohio’s Vote, TIME SWAMPLAND,
(Nov. 6, 2012), http://swampland.time.com/2012/11/06/jon-husted-the-most-powerful-man-in-the-
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prove, of course, but critics of these chief election officials have pointed to
decisions that seem likely to benefit the official’s own party.
Wisconsin is the only state with a truly nonpartisan board structure. It is
unique among the states in requiring supermajority confirmation of new
commissioners, so as to insulate board members from partisan pressures. This
does not guarantee decision making that is blind to partisan effects, but it provides
a greater level of protection against partisan decision making than the structure of
any other state.
Although Wisconsin’s structure is unique among its fellow states, independent election management authorities are the norm in the democratic world.60 In
fact, independent election administration is widely viewed as essential to the
integrity of the democratic process.61 The primary rationale for insulating election
management bodies from partisan politics is to guard against conflicts of interest
that might distort their decision making. As the influential European Commission
for Democracy Through Law (also known as the Venice Commission) has
explained: “Only transparency, impartiality and independence from politically motivated
manipulation will ensure proper administration of the election process, from the
preelection period to the end of the processing of results.”62 The International
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance has likewise identified an
“autonomous and impartial” electoral management body as an internationally
recognized standard for fair elections.63
The most common means by which other countries insulate election
management from partisan politics is by having an independent electoral commission.64
Australia,65 Canada,66 and India67 are among the countries with such a commission. In other countries, election administration is delegated to a government

ohio-vote; see also Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Epilogue: Bush v. Gore and the Constitutional
Right to Vote 4 (New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 381, 2013)
(discussing litigation surrounding 2012 election in Ohio).
60. I have discussed other countries’ election management structures in greater length in
Tokaji, supra note 3, at 137–42, and Daniel P. Tokaji, Public Rights and Private Rights of Action: The
Enforcement of Federal Election Laws, 44 IND. L. REV. 113, 120–25 (2010).
61. See LÓPEZ-PINTOR, supra note 1, at 12.
62. Eur. Comm’n for Democracy Through Law, Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters, at 26,
Opinion No. 190/2002 (Oct. 18, 2002) (emphasis added), available at http://www.venice.coe.int/
WebForms/documents/?pdf=CDL(2002)139-e.
63. INT’L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY & ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 1, at 37.
64. LÓPEZ-PINTOR, supra note 1, at 11; see also MASSICOTTE ET AL., supra note 1, at 83–97; Ihl,
supra note 1, at 87–89. The discussion in the text relies mostly on López-Pintor’s categorization.
LÓPEZ-PINTOR, supra note 1, at 21–26.
65. LÓPEZ-PINTOR, supra note 1, at 146; MASSICOTTE ET AL., supra note 1, at 99–101.
66. MASSICOTTE ET AL., supra note 1, at 99–101; Frank Emmert et al., Trouble Counting Votes?
Comparing Voting Mechanisms in the United States and Selected Other Countries, 41 CREIGHTON L. REV. 3,
8–9 (2007).
67. David Gilmartin, One Day’s Sultan: T.N. Seshan and Indian Democracy, 43 CONTRIBUTIONS
TO INDIAN SOC. 247, 250 (2009) (describing India’s electoral commission).
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ministry which, though not formally independent of the ruling party, enjoys
considerable practical insulation from partisan politics by virtue of having a strong
core of professional civil servants. This is the case in several Western European
countries, including Belgium, Denmark, and Sweden.68 Still other countries
disperse authority among different components of the national government. An
example is the French system, in which a government ministry and judges share
responsibility.69 Such divided authority tends to assure fair election administration
by providing a relatively impartial check on government power. While the United
States is not completely alone in delegating authority to partisan elected officials at
the state level, we are at the far end of the spectrum in the partisanship of our
election administration system.70
Compounding the challenges inherent in the partisan administration of
elections at the state level is the extreme decentralization of the U.S. system. Most
of the authority for running elections lies with state election officials, and the
thousands of county and municipal officials scattered across the country. In
contrast to virtually all other democratic countries, we lack an entity within the
national government that has power over election administration. It is true that
the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) created the Election Assistance
Commission (EAC), a four-member bipartisan board charged with overseeing
some of its requirements.71 But from the beginning, this entity was designed to
have as little power as possible.72 In the first several years of its existence, the
EAC was plagued by multiple problems that hindered its effectiveness, including
the late appointment of commissioners, inadequate funding, a lack of regulatory
authority, partisan stalemate, failure to release information, and excessive
deference to state and local election officials.73 As of 2013, the EAC was without a
single sitting commissioner and some have called for it to be eliminated entirely.74
Although federal courts have come to police election administration more
aggressively in the years since 2000,75 most of the authority still lies with state and
local officials.
Election administration in the United States thus remains mostly a matter of
state law and local practice. The means by which local election officials are chosen,
as well as their degree of professionalization, varies dramatically from state to
state—and sometimes within a particular state. While all states have election laws

68. LÓPEZ-PINTOR, supra note 1, at 59.
69. See Tokaji, supra note 60, at 121 (citing LÓPEZ-PINTOR, supra note 1, at 22, 60–61).
70. Tokaji, supra note 3, at 127.
71. See id. at 130.
72. See Leonard M. Shambon, Implementing the Help America Vote Act, 3 ELECTION L.J. 424, 428
(2004) (describing the EAC as an agency “designed to have as little regulatory power as possible”).
73. Tokaji, supra note 3, at 135–36.
74. Amanda Becker, The Phantom Commission, ROLL CALL, Nov. 1, 2012, at 1.
75. See Daniel P. Tokaji & Owen Wolfe, Baker, Bush, and Ballot Boards: The Federalization of
Election Administration, 62 CASE. W. RES. L. REV. 969, 969–71 (2012).
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and a state chief election authority, much of the on-the-ground work of running
elections rests with officials at the county or municipal level. Roughly two-thirds
of local jurisdictions elect those charged with running their elections, with partyaffiliated officials in almost half of local jurisdictions.76 According to one study,
forty-six percent of local jurisdictions have party-affiliated election authorities,
while fourteen percent had bipartisan and twenty-nine percent had nonpartisan
local election authorities.77
The United States is therefore unusual in the degree of decentralization of its
election administration system as well as its partisanship. In contrast to most other
countries, partisan election administration is the near-universal norm at the state
level and is common at the local level. We are also highly decentralized, more so
than any other democratic country. This is evident both at the top of our system,
in the absence of a national entity with real power over election administration,
and at the bottom, in the wide variation among the thousands of local officials
with day-to-day responsibility for running our elections.
Although Wisconsin’s state-level election management institution is unique,
the state is not immune from the problems that accompany the highly
decentralized system for running elections in the United States. In fact,
Wisconsin’s problems are especially serious in some respects. In particular, the
degree of decentralization in Wisconsin is extremely high—even by the
hyperdecentralized standard of the United States. In most states, local authority
for running elections rests primarily at the county level. In Wisconsin and a few
other states, however, most authority for running elections rests at the municipal
level—that is, in cities, towns, and villages—although county officials also play an
important role in counting votes, as we shall see.78 County clerks in Milwaukee are
elected, while municipal clerks may either be elected or appointed.79 There are
1851 municipalities in Wisconsin, ranging in size from tiny towns with just a few
voters to the City of Milwaukee with hundreds of thousands of voters.80
Despite its high degree of decentralization, Wisconsin also has some features
that are hospitable to the evenhanded administration of elections. In particular, it
has a strong good government tradition, stretching at least as far back as the
Progressive Era of the early twentieth century.81 The state has relatively high voter

76.
77.
78.

Kimball et al., supra note 4, at 453.
Kimball & Kropf, supra note 4, at 1261 tbl.1.
For a discussion of Waukesha County Clerk Kathy Nickolaus, see TIMOTHY R. VERHOFF,
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION REPORT IN THE MATTER OF WAUKESHA COUNTY CLERK KATHY
NICKOLAUS, WIS. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY BD. CASE #2011-04, at 2 (2011), available at http://gab
.wi.gov/sites/default/files/news/65/waukesha_independent_investigation_final_report_pd_71534
.pdf. See also infra notes 176, 181–90 and accompanying text.
79. HUEFNER ET AL., supra note 12, at 113–14.
80. HUEFNER ET AL., supra note 51, at 39; HUEFNER ET AL., supra note 12, at 111.
81. HUEFNER ET AL., supra note 12, at 111.
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turnout and its election officials have generally enjoyed a good reputation for
professionalism.82
All these features of Wisconsin’s election system distinguish it from all other
states. Of course, every state has its own unique election ecosystem.83 For this
reason, it is important to resist overly simplistic comparisons among states. At the
same time, the fact that Wisconsin’s state election authority is so different from
those of other states makes it particularly worthy of careful study—including
consideration of whether this nonpartisan model should be exported elsewhere.
II. THE EXPERIENCE OF WISCONSIN’S GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY BOARD
The first five years of the GAB’s existence were an especially tumultuous
period in Wisconsin politics. Despite its traditionally civil political climate,
Wisconsin has not been immune from the intense polarization that increasingly
grips the country. In fact, it has been a leading example of this polarization. This
atmosphere presents major challenges for an independent board charged with
fairly administering state laws governing the political process. This Part addresses
five of the most significant election administration issues that the GAB
confronted between its establishment in 2007 and 2012. In examining its
performance in these areas, my objective is to consider how effectively it has
performed its role of administering electoral rules fairly. This is an inherently
subjective inquiry, of course, as reasonable observers may differ in their
assessments of that question. That said, my overall judgment is that the GAB has
been very effective in doing the job it was created to do.84
A. Voter Registration
In its first three years of existence, the GAB faced major challenges—
including a lawsuit filed by the state attorney general—having to do with its
statewide registration database.85 Some background on changes in the way that
voter registration is handled, both in Wisconsin and nationally, is necessary to
understand this issue.
Until 2006, Wisconsin was one of two states that did not require voter

82. Id. But see JAMES K. CONANT, WISCONSIN POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT: AMERICA’S
LABORATORY OF DEMOCRACY 83–90 (2006) (discussing Wisconsin’s tradition of professionalism in
government, but noting more instances of discord and alleged corruption in the 1980s and 1990s).
83. See generally HUEFNER ET AL., supra note 12 (examining the different election ecosystems in
Ohio, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota).
84. The accounts that follow are based upon publicly available information including court
filings, GAB memos, complaints filed with the GAB, and in some cases press reports.
85. Van Hollen v. Gov’t Accountability Bd., No. 08-CV-4085, (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2008),
available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/vanhollen-order-10-23-08.pdf.
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registration for all voters.86 Under state law, Wisconsin municipalities with fewer
than 5000 people were not required to have voter registration.87 Only 312 of the
state’s 1851 municipalities actually had voter registration,88 although approximately
three-quarters of voters lived in jurisdictions where voter registration was
required.89 As in most other states, registration lists were kept at the local, and not
the state, level. Under section 303 of HAVA, Wisconsin was required to create a
statewide voter registration database for the first time.90 The basic idea was to
move lists from the local level to the state level, ensuring consistency and making
it easier to keep track of voters when they moved from one jurisdiction to another
within a state. HAVA’s statewide voter registration database mandate was
originally scheduled to become effective in 2004, but the statute allowed states to
extend their deadline until 2006.91 Like most of the states, Wisconsin availed itself
of this extension.92
Even before the GAB existed, the process of creating a statewide registration
database was fraught with difficulty. This was due in part to the large number of
local electoral jurisdictions in Wisconsin and the fact that most of them had no
voter registration at all before 2006, but it was also attributable to technical
problems. The State Election Board contracted with Accenture to create the
software for its Statewide Voter Registration System (SVRS), allocating $27.5
million in federal HAVA funds for this purpose.93 The transition did not go
smoothly. Among the problems with the new system were slow speeds in entering
data, associated high costs for local election officials, data entry errors, problems
in generating walk lists for candidates, and difficulties in “matching” voters against
the statewide registration list.94 This occasioned a great deal of frustration on the
part of election officials, much of it directed toward Accenture.95 As a result of
these technical problems, Wisconsin’s HAVA database was not fully functional
until August 2008.96
The “matching” requirement is what ultimately led to litigation against the
86. The other was North Dakota, which still does not have voter registration. Qualifications for
Voting in North Dakota, N.D. SECRETARY OF STATE, http://www.nd.gov/sos/electvote/voting/
voter-qualifi.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2013).
87. HUEFNER ET AL., supra note 12, at 113, 124.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 113.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 15483(a)(1) (2006).
91. Id. § 15483(d).
92. Daniel P. Tokaji, Early Returns on Election Reform: Discretion, Disenfranchisement and the Help
America Vote Act, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1206, 1216 (2005).
93. HUEFNER ET AL., supra note 12, at 123.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 123–24.
96. SARAH WHITT, ST. OF WIS. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY BD., A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF
HAVA CHECKS IN WISCONSIN AUGUST 6, 2008 THROUGH JANUARY 4, 2009, at 2 (2009), available at
http://www.gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files/publication/65/statistical_analysis_hava_checks_01_09
_pdf_10016.pdf.
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GAB, brought by the Republican state attorney general.97 In addition to
mandating the creation of statewide voter registration databases, section 303 of
HAVA includes the following requirement:
The chief State election official and the official responsible for the State
motor vehicle authority of a State shall enter into an agreement to match
information in the database of the statewide voter registration system
with information in the database of the motor vehicle authority to the
extent required to enable each such official to verify the accuracy of the
information provided on applications for voter registration.98
The notion behind this requirement was that comparing the information in
new statewide registration lists against the information in state motor vehicle
records would ensure accuracy. Yet HAVA was not very clear on how this
matching was to be done, or on the consequences of a failed match.99
As a result, there was great variation among states in how they conducted
HAVA matches and what the consequences of a failed match were.100 Some states
required an exact match, while others only required a partial or substantial
match.101 In terms of consequences, the typical practice is not to prevent people
from voting due solely to a failed match, but instead to require that voters provide
non–photographic means of confirming their information.102 The concern with
requiring an exact match or disqualifying voters whose information does not
match is that a nonmatch may be due to some administrative error. Specifically,
errors may appear in databases for a variety of reasons that have nothing to do
with fraud or eligibility such as typographic errors, transposed names, marriage,
transposed fields (e.g., Yao Ming rather than Ming Yao), double names (e.g., Billy
Bob [first name] Thornton [last name] rather than Billy [first] Bob [middle]
Thornton [last]), hyphenated names (e.g., Gabriel Garcia Marquez rather than
Gabriel Garcia-Marquez), and omitted information. They may be due to dataentry errors that have nothing to do with voter eligibility.103 A large number of
nonmatches occur when comparing voter registration databases with other

97. See Van Hollen v. Gov’t Accountability Bd., No. 08-CV-4085, at *8 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct.
23, 2008), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/VanHollen-Order
-10-23-08.pdf.
98. 42 U.S.C. § 15483(a)(5)(B)(I) (2006).
99. See Daniel P. Tokaji, Voter Registration and Institutional Reform: Lessons from a Historic Election,
3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. ONLINE 1, 6 (Jan. 22, 2009), http://www.hlpronline.com/Tokaji_HLPR
_012209.pdf.
100. See Nathan Cemenska & Sarah Cherry, Key Questions for Key States: Executive Summary,
ELECTION L. @ MORITZ 10–12 (Sept. 3, 2008), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/projects/
maps2008/50QsforExecutiveSummarywithlinks.pdf.
101. Id. at 10–11.
102. Id. at 11.
103. Justin Levitt et al., Making the List: Database Matching and Verification Processes for Voter
Registration, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUST. 4 (Mar. 24, 2006), http://www.brennancenter.org/
dynamic/subpages/download_file_49479.pdf.
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databases for reasons that have nothing to do with voter eligibility. Prior to the
2008 election, the GAB found that over one in five new voters (twenty-two
percent) had information in the voter registration database that did not match
motor vehicle records.104
Wisconsin Attorney General J.B. Van Hollen’s lawsuit against the GAB
arose from the board’s decision to allow nonmatched voters to cast a regular
ballot.105 Its rationale was that many voters in this category were actually eligible
voters who had been voting for years, and should not be denied a regular ballot
due to a possible administrative error.106 Van Hollen, a Republican, disagreed with
the GAB’s decision. While the complaint in Van Hollen v. Government Accountability
Board 107 was not very precise on the relief being sought, it alleged that the failure
to “remove ineligible voters and to conduct or require HAVA checks” could
result in tens of thousands of people being allowed to vote despite discrepancies
that “may, in fact, provide evidence that they are not eligible to vote.”108 A state
circuit court dismissed the case a few weeks later, concluding that there was no
legal requirement that a voter be matched as a precondition to voting.109 This legal
conclusion was correct, as neither HAVA nor Wisconsin law required that
nonmatched voters either be removed from voting lists or required to cast a
provisional ballot. Section 303 instead imposes a requirement that state election
authorities enter into agreements for database matching with their state motor
vehicle authority, saying nothing about any consequence on voters if the match
fails.
While this ended the litigation, the reliability of the GAB’s matching protocol
remained an open question. After the 2008 election, the GAB attempted to
determine the reliability of its matching protocol by examining the nonmatch rates

104. Patrick Marley, Voter Registration Information Often Doesn’t Match Driver Records,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Aug. 28, 2008, at 1B.
105. SARAH WHITT, ST. OF WIS. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY BD., FINAL REPORT OF THE
RETROACTIVE HAVA CHECK PROJECT 2 (2010), available at http://gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files/
publication/69/final_report_of_the_retroactive_hava_check_pdf_19864.pdf.
106. ST. OF WIS. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY BD., GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY BOARD’S
PROTOCOL: RETROACTIVE HAVA CHECKS OF VOTER RECORDS 5 (2009), available at
http://gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files/publication/69/final_report_of_the_retroactive_hava_check_p
df_19864.pdf (Appendix 1).
107. Documents from this case may be found at Van Hollen v. Government Accountability Board,
ELECTION L. @ MORITZ, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/vanhollenv.gab.php (last
visited Feb. 3, 2013).
108. Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 12, Van Hollen v. Gov’t Accountability Bd., No. 08CV-4085 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2008), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/
documents/VanHollen-Complaint.pdf. The author joined an amicus brief in opposition to the
petition.
109. Van Hollen v. Gov’t Accountability Bd., No. 08-cv-004085, at *18 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct.
23, 2008), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/VanHollen-Order
-10-23-08.pdf.
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of those who registered between 2006 and 2008.110 The GAB uncovered a large
number of problems when conducting HAVA checks.111 According to a report
prepared by the GAB, twelve percent resulted in a nonmatch.112 Thus, if
nonmatched voters had been required to cast provisional ballots in the November
2008 election, then between 18,000 and 24,000 voters would have been subjected
to this requirement—seventy-eight times the number of provisional ballots cast in
the previous election.113 Such a high number of provisional ballots, in a state that
has traditionally cast few provisional ballots, would be expected to have caused
considerable administrative headaches for election officials, poll workers, and
voters alike. Thus, with the benefit of hindsight, it is evident that the GAB made
the right call in not requiring nonmatched voters to cast a provisional ballot. At
the same time, the GAB’s post-2008 study revealed serious problems with
Wisconsin’s matching procedure—though ones shared with other states, which
had similar difficulties implementing the matching requirement of HAVA.
In the end, the GAB wound up following a process designed to remove
from the list those who are not residing at their registered address, while avoiding
the removal of eligible voters. To comply with HAVA’s mandate consistent with
state law, the GAB sent two separate mailings to nonmatched voters, in an effort
to ascertain whether they are really living at the address at which they are
registered. In 2009, its initial mailing went out to 87,000 voters who were flagged
in checks for non-matches,114 telling voters that their registration information did
not match. For those whose letter was returned as undeliverable, the GAB sent
out a second letter stating that the GAB has reliable information that the registrant
no longer resides at the address under which he is registered, and giving the
registrant thirty days to respond or be inactivated in the voter rolls.115 Those who
did not respond or who again had their letters returned as undeliverable were
deactivated. The GAB had statutory authority to do so pursuant to a state
statute.116 In the end, some 8000 voters were inactivated following this process.117
110. WHITT, supra note 96, at ii.
111. See id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. WHITT, supra note 105, at 3.
115. ST. OF WIS. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY BD., 30 DAY NOTICE LETTER TO RETROACTIVE
HAVA CHECK UNDELIVERABLES FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2010), available at http://gab
.wi.gov/sites/default/files/memo/20/retro_hava_30_day_notice_faq_final_10_11_10_pdf_15767.pdf.
116. Upon receipt of reliable information that a registered elector has changed his or her
residence to a location outside of the municipality, the municipal clerk or board of election
commissioners shall notify the elector by mailing a notice by 1st class mail to the elector’s
registration address stating the source of the information. . . . If the elector no longer
resides in the municipality or fails to apply for continuation of registration within 30 days
of the date the notice is mailed, the clerk or board of election commissioners shall change
the elector’s registration from eligible to ineligible status.
WIS. STAT. § 6.50(3) (2010).
117. Memorandum from Kevin J. Kennedy, Dir. & Gen. Counsel, Wis. Gov’t Accountability
Bd., to Members of the Gov’t Accountability Bd. 5 (Dec. 13, 2010), available at http://gab.wi.gov/
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According to the GAB, there was no evidence anyone on the list attempted to
vote fraudulently in 2010.118 In some other states, the deactivation of voters in this
way might be problematic. But the existence of Election Day registration in
Wisconsin tends to mitigate this difficulty.119 Even if a voter is wrongly omitted
from the rolls, he or she can still go to the polling place on Election Day, reregister, and cast a ballot that will count.
Maintenance of voter registration lists is an issue fraught with partisan
tension, with Republicans generally urging aggressive purging of lists to prevent
fraud, and Democrats urging a more cautious approach to avoid disenfranchising
eligible voters. While the issue of HAVA matching has been a troublesome one
for Wisconsin and other states, the GAB appears to have found a reasonable
solution, handling the problems that emerged in a studied and careful way. In
2008, it wisely resisted the call for nonmatched voters to be omitted from the lists
or compelled to cast a provisional ballot; but in 2010, it implemented a process
that complies with HAVA’s matching requirement, while avoiding unnecessary
burdens on eligible voters.
B. Early and Absentee Voting
Early and absentee voting has been the subject of heated debate throughout
the United States in recent years. The 2008 Obama campaign made extensive use
of early voting in several key states, a tactic that was seen as helpful in improving
turnout among the Democratic base. In 2011, after Republicans swept into the
legislature and governor’s office in a number of states, they enacted legislation to
limit early voting in a handful of states, including swing states Ohio120 and
Florida121—much to the dismay of Democrats and voting rights activists.
Wisconsin’s consideration of early voting was less charged with partisan
acrimony than that of other states. Since 2000, Wisconsin has long allowed voters
to cast absentee ballots at their municipal clerk’s office before Election Day
without an excuse.122 While in-person absentee voting is similar to early voting
(some might say functionally identical), voters are technically casting an absentee
ballot. As with mail-in absentee ballots, the voter fills out an application at the

sites/default/files/event/74/12_13_14_2010open_session_all_docs_with_agenda_pdf_14491.pdf
(PDF pages 38–46).
118. More Than 12,000 Voters Ineligible to Cast Ballots, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Oct. 28, 2010),
http://www.jsonline.com/news/wisconsin/106088073.html.
119. Wisconsin is exempt from the requirements of the National Voter Registration Act,
including those which relate to list maintenance, because it has Election Day Registration. 42 U.S.C. §
1973gg-2(b)(2) (2006).
120. H.B. 194, 129th Gen. Assem. (Oh. 2011) (repealed Sub. S.B. 295, 129th Gen. Assem.
(Oh. 2012)).
121. 2011 Fla. Laws 40.
122. 1999 Wisconsin Act 182 § 90m,WIS. STAT. § 6.85 (2000), amended by 2011 Wisconsin Act
23 § 55.
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clerk’s office and is then given an absentee ballot. After marking the ballot, the
voter places it in an envelope that is not tabulated until Election Day, rather than
using an electronic voting machine or feeding the ballot through a scanner as
would be done on Election Day.123 Like many other states, Wisconsin has seen a
sharp increase in the percentage of people voting by absentee ballot in recent
years, going from around six percent in 2000 to twelve percent in 2004 to twentyone percent in 2008.124 The large number of absentee voters in the 2008 election
led some to question whether it would make sense to move to a “true” early
voting system, in which voters would cast ballots electronically or through a
tabulating machine, just as on Election Day.125 Some local election officials
complained of the administrative burdens associated with processing large
numbers of ballots in the days immediately prior to Election Day.126
These concerns led the GAB to undertake a study of early voting,
considering both changes the GAB might make itself as well as ones that would
require statutory amendments. The GAB’s staff proceeded in a methodical
fashion, examining the experience of other states as well as academic studies of
early voting. It also conducted “listening sessions” with local election officials,
academics, and members of the public.127 In the face of strong resistance from
municipal clerks,128 GAB staff ultimately recommended an option that stopped
short of full-scale early voting, citing costs and Wisconsin voters’ relatively high
level of satisfaction with the existing process,129 as well as possible confusion
among voters.130 Instead, GAB staff recommended a more streamlined version of
in-person absentee voting,131 which would include: (1) allowing people to vote in
multiple satellite locations (not just the clerk’s office),132 (2) keeping the hours for
in-person absentee voting flexible,133 (3) allowing a simplified application process
for in-person absentee voting,134 (4) changing the start date for in-person absentee
voting from thirty to twenty days before Election Day,135 and (5) retaining the end

123. ADAM HARVELL & EDWARD EDNEY, ST. OF WIS. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY BD., AN
EXAMINATION OF EARLY VOTING IN WISCONSIN 2 (2009), available at http://gab.wi.gov/sites/
default/files/publication/65/early_voting_report_final_pdf_25757.pdf.
124. Id. at 1.
125. Id.
126. See Peter Maller, Clerks Brace for Voting Crowds Officials Expect a Long, Grueling Election Day,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 2, 2004, at 5B.
127. HARVELL & EDNEY, supra note 123, at 4–5.
128. Panel Recommends Against Early Voting, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Dec. 16, 2009),
http://www.jsonline.com/news/wisconsin/79400042.html.
129. HARVELL & EDNEY, supra note 123, at 18.
130. Id. at 21.
131. Id. at 19–21.
132. Id. at 20.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 19–20.
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date for in-person absentee voting of Monday, the day before Election Day, at
5:00 p.m.136
In the end, the GAB adopted all of its staff’s recommendations but the last
one.137 Instead of retaining the preexisting deadline for in-person absentee voting,
the GAB recommended that the legislature move up the deadline to 5:00 p.m. or
the close of business (whichever is later) on the Friday before Election Day.138
This was framed as a recommendation because its implementation required
statutory change. The rationale for the earlier deadline was that allowing in-person
absentee voting to proceed through the day before the election put too much
strain on local election officials, who were required to witness, seal, and sort
absentee ballots. This made it difficult for them to complete the other tasks for
which they were responsible in the immediate run-up to Election Day. The state
adopted this recommendation through legislation enacted in 2011, which moved
up the deadline for in-person absentee voting from the day before Election Day to
the Friday before Election Day.139
Reasonable minds can certainly disagree over whether moving up the
deadline for in-person absentee voting was a wise policy choice. There is
undoubtedly some tension between administrative costs for election officials on
the one hand and voter convenience on the other. It cannot reasonably be
disputed, however, that the GAB and its staff analyzed the question in a careful
and methodical way, taking into consideration the costs and benefits of this and
other proposed changes to early and absentee voting in Wisconsin. The same,
unfortunately, cannot be said for the state legislature. The change in the deadline
for early voting was adopted on a party line vote,140 as part of the same legislation
that included the highly controversial photo ID requirement, which is discussed
below. Still, the GAB’s consideration of the issue represents precisely the sort of
studied approach to the question of early voting that one would hope for from a
nonpartisan election administration body.
C. Voter Identification
In the years since HAVA’s enactment, no election administration topic has
been more contentious than voter identification. HAVA adopted a limited ID
requirement, applicable only to first-time voters who registered by mail. The

136. Id. at 20.
137. See ST. OF WIS. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY BD., OPEN SESSION MINUTES 9–10 (2009),
available at http://gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files/event/2009_12_17_gab_open_session_minutes_pdf
_97306.pdf.
138. Id.
139. 2011 Wisconsin Act 23 § 57, WIS. STAT. § 6.86(1)(b) (2010).
140. See Detailed Results of Wis. Assembly Vote on AB 7, WIS. LEGIS. DOCUMENTS (May 11,
2011), http://legis.wisconsin.gov/2011/data/votes/av0330.pdf; Detailed Results of Wis. Senate Vote on
AB 7, WIS. LEGIS. DOCUMENTS (May 19, 2011), http://legis.wisconsin.gov/2011/data/votes/
sv0192.pdf.
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statute did not require those voters to produce photo identification; it also allowed
documentary identification such as a bank statement, utility bill, or government
document with the voter’s name and address.141 Since HAVA’s enactment, a
number of states have gone further, requiring some or all voters to present
government-issued photo identification in order to have their votes counted.142
Georgia, Indiana, and Missouri were the first to impose such a requirement in
2005 and 2006. While Missouri’s state supreme court struck down that state’s law,
the U.S. Supreme Court upheld Indiana’s photo ID requirement in Crawford v.
Marion County Elections Board,143 and Georgia’s law survived legal challenges in
federal and state courts.144
Given the intense partisan debate surrounding voter ID, it is no surprise that
this issue has provided the most severe test of the GAB’s nonpartisanship. Since
the 2010 general election, several additional states have adopted or toughened
voter ID laws.145 Wisconsin is among them, adopting a strict government-issued
photo ID law in 2011,146 which has since been enjoined by state courts.147 The
GAB provided information to the state legislature when the bill was under
consideration and recommended some changes,148 though it did not take a
position for or against the bill.149 The implementation of the voter ID statute
nevertheless precipitated what is probably the most serious threat to the GAB’s
independence.

141. See The Rules on Registering to Vote, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 15, 2004, at 6Z.
142. For a list of state identification requirements, see Voter Id: State Requirements, NAT’L
CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/voter-id.aspx
(last visited Feb. 2, 2013).
143. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Elections Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 188–89 (2008).
144. See Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340, 1345 (11th Cir. 2009); Perdue v. Lake,
647 S.E.2d 6, 7–8 (Ga. 2007).
145. See Voter ID: 2011 Legislation, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl
.org/legislatures-elections/elections/voter-id-2011-legislation.aspx (last updated Jan. 26, 2012) (listing
action on all state voter ID bills in 2011); Voter ID: 2012 Legislation, NAT’L CONF. OF ST.
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/voter-id-2012-legislation.aspx
(last updated Jan. 10, 2013) (listing action on all state voter ID bills in 2012); see also Voter Identification
Requirements, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/
elections/voter-id.aspx (last updated Feb. 14, 2013) (featuring an interactive map which lists general
voter ID requirement in all U.S. states).
146. 2011 Wisconsin Act 23 §§ 1, 45 (adding WIS. STAT. § 5.02(6m) (2011) and amending
§ 6.79(2)(a) (2010)).
147. Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP v. Walker, No. 11-CV-5492 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 2012),
appeal docketed, No. 2012AP1652 (Wis. Ct. App. July 23, 2012); League of Women Voters v. Walker,
No. 11-CV-4669 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 2012), appeal docketed, No. 2012AP584 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2012).
148. Kevin J. Kennedy, Dir. & Gen. Counsel, Wis. Gov’t Accountability Bd., Remarks
Presented to Wis. Senate Comm. on Transp. & Elections (Jan. 26, 2011), available at
http://gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files/publication/65/kennedy_senate_committee_testimony_1_26_
11_pdf_12141.pdf; see also Core Principles of Voter Photo ID, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY BOARD ST. OF
WIS., http://gab.wi.gov/node/1588 (last visited Feb. 2, 2013).
149. Letter from Kevin J. Kennedy, Dir. & Gen. Counsel, Wis. Gov’t Accountability Bd., to
Members of Wis. State Legislature 1 (Jan. 12, 2011) (on file with author).
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Wisconsin’s voter ID statute (2011 Wisconsin Act 23) sets forth an exclusive
list of the documents that constitute acceptable photo identification.150 Among the
documents on that list is a student ID card from an accredited college or
university, which expires not more than two years after its date of issuance.151 In
implementing this requirement, the GAB made two decisions that aroused
opposition from some of the Republican supporters of the ID law. The first
concerned the statute’s requirement that student IDs have an expiration date less
than two years from their date of issuance to be acceptable.152 Most college IDs
lack such an expiration date, but the GAB voted unanimously to allow colleges to
affix stickers on existing college IDs so that they could be used to vote.153 The
second GAB decision that aroused Republican opposition concerned the use of
ID cards from technical colleges. The GAB initially concluded that technical
college IDs could not be used, but later reversed itself.154 Based on a textualist
interpretation of “college,” the term used in the statute, the GAB concluded that
IDs from technical colleges fall within the scope of an acceptable ID.155 The GAB
reached this conclusion despite the fact that there was a failed attempt to include
specifically technical colleges during the legislative debate over the voter ID bill.156
Notwithstanding this legislative history, the board believed that the plain meaning
of the statute required acceptance of technical college IDs.157
The existence of such a disagreement would not, by itself, constitute a threat
to the GAB’s independence. The problem in the case of photo IDs stemmed from
another statute that was adopted in 2011, pertaining to state rulemaking (2011
Wisconsin Act 21). This statute requires that proposed rules be approved not only
by the body with policymaking authority over the topic but also by the governor.158

150. WIS. STAT. § 5.02(6m) (2012).
151. Specifically, the statute provides that acceptable ID includes:
An unexpired identification card issued by a university or college in this state that is
accredited, as defined in s. 39.30(1)(d), that contains the date of issuance and signature of
the individual to whom it is issued and that contains an expiration date indicating that the
card expires no later than 2 years after the date of issuance if the individual establishes that
he or she is enrolled as a student at the university or college on the date that the card is
presented.
WIS. STAT. § 5.02(6m)(f).
152. Memorandum from Kevin J. Kennedy, Dir. & Gen. Counsel, Wis. Gov’t Accountability
Bd., to Members of the Wis. Gov’t Accountability Bd. 4–5 (Sept. 12, 2011), available at http://gab.wi
.gov/sites/default/files/event/74/open_session_all_with_agenda_september_2011_pdf_17118.pdf
(PDF pages 34–39).
153. Id.
154. Patrick Marley, Elections Board Reverses Itself on Tech School IDs at Polls, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Nov. 9. 2011, at 1B.
155. Kevin J. Kennedy, Dir. & Gen. Counsel, Wis. Gov’t Accountability Bd., Written
Remarks for the Joint Comm. on Review of Admin. Rules 3 (Nov. 15, 2011), available at http://gab.wi
.gov/sites/default/files/publication/137/kevin_kennedy_jcrar_testimony_11_15_11_pdf_16716.pdf.
156. Memorandum from Kevin J. Kennedy, supra note 152, at 2.
157. Id.
158. WIS. STAT. § 227.135(2) (2012).
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The GAB has statutory authority to promulgate rules for the purpose of
interpreting or implementing state election administration statutes.159 Under
previous law, the agency alone had the power to promulgate a rule within its
jurisdiction but, as a result of the 2011 statute, gubernatorial approval must also be
obtained.160
Although the GAB’s decisions with respect to stickers and technical college
IDs were not initially made in the form of a rule, a legislative committee (the Joint
Committee for Review of Administrative Rules or JCRAR)161 has the power to
require state agencies to promulgate rules addressing the content of administrative
decisions in appropriate circumstances. Specifically, JCRAR may direct an agency
to promulgate an emergency rule if it determines that “a statement of policy or an
interpretation of a statute meets the definition of a rule.”162 In the case of the
GAB’s ID policies, the committee voted six to four along party lines—with all
Republicans supporting and all Democrats opposing—to force the board to write
administrative rules embodying their policies relating to technical college IDs and
stickers.163 The upshot of the legislative committee’s action was to require that
Republican Governor Scott Walker approve the GAB’s interpretation of the ID
requirement before it could take effect. In addition, this process would have
delayed the effective date of the ID policy approved by the GAB by
approximately two months.164
In the end, the controversy over the forms of acceptable ID was rendered
moot (at least temporarily) by the decisions of two lower state courts enjoining
Wisconsin’s ID law in its entirety on state constitutional grounds.165 Still, this
episode is an ominous sign for those concerned about whether an independent
election administration agency can function effectively when considering a
contentious issue in an intensely partisan legislative environment. Due to the 2011
changes to Wisconsin’s rulemaking process, a legislative committee may effectively
require gubernatorial approval for the GAB’s interpretation and implementation

159. Id. § 5.05(1)(f) (2012).
160. 2011 Wisconsin Act 21 § 4, WIS. STAT. § 227.135(2) (2012).
161. Wisconsin law vests the JCRAR with oversight responsibility over agency rulemaking. See
WIS. STAT. § 227.19(4) (2012).
162. WIS. STAT. § 227.26(2)(b) (2012).
163. Patrick Marley, Election Panel Told to Write Rule on Technical College ID Use, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/election-panel-told-to-write
-rule-on-technical-college-id-use-3l32ikn-133904558.html.
164. Memorandum from Kevin J. Kennedy, Dir. & Gen. Counsel, Wis. Gov’t. Accountability
Bd., to Members of the Gov’t. Accountability Bd. 2–3 (Dec. 13, 2011), available at http://gab.wi.gov/
sites/default/files/event/74/12_13_11_open_agenda_and_board_materials_pdf_67032.pdf
(PDF
pages 75–84).
165. See Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP v. Walker, No. 11-CV-5492 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 2012),
appeal docketed, No. 2012AP1652 (Wis. Ct. App. July 23, 2012); League of Women Voters v. Walker,
No. 11-CV-4669 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 2012), appeal docketed, No. 2012AP584 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2012).
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of state election administration law.166 This leaves considerable room for mischief
by elected officials intent on tampering with the GAB’s decisions and
undermining its mission of administering elections without partisan bias.
D. Reporting of Election Results
The most embarrassing election administration episode to occur during the
GAB’s tenure was the misreporting of election results during an extremely close
state supreme court contest in 2011. Close elections have engendered heated legal
debates in the modern era of election administration, from Florida’s 2000
presidential election to Washington’s 2004 gubernatorial election to Minnesota’s
2008 U.S. Senate election. The problems in Wisconsin’s 2011 election were
attributable to mistakes by a local election official. The GAB’s handling of this
dispute provides evidence of its capacity to function effectively in the incendiary
environment that tends to accompany razor-close elections. It thus provides a
window into how Wisconsin’s state and local election infrastructure would
perform in the event of a higher profile postelection dispute. It also demonstrates
the testy relationship that can exist between the nonpartisan GAB and partyaffiliated election officials at the county level.167
On April 5, 2011, Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice David Prosser faced
Assistant Attorney General JoAnne Kloppenberg in a general election for a seat
on the state supreme court. Although Wisconsin Supreme Court elections are
technically nonpartisan in that candidates do not run as nominees of their party,
Prosser is a former Republican state legislator while Kloppenberg is a
Democrat.168 And despite its nominally nonpartisan status, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court has been riven by rancorous and highly publicized ideological
conflicts, which have sometimes gotten ugly.169 Justice Prosser has been a
protagonist in these dramas. He reportedly called the court’s liberal Chief Justice
Shirley Abramson a “total bitch” and threatened to “destroy” her.170 Later, a
confrontation involving Justice Prosser reportedly turned physical, with fellow
Justice Ann Walsh Bradley alleging that he attempted to choke her the day before
the court was to issue its split decision upholding a controversial statute limiting

166. See supra p. 595–96.
167. County clerks (the chief election official at the county level) are elected as nominees of
their parties. As noted above, municipal election officials are mainly responsible for running elections
at the local level in Wisconsin, in contrast to most other states where this authority rests at the county
level. But county officials do have important responsibilities in connection with some elections,
including responsibility for reporting results and handling postelection proceedings. HUEFNER ET
AL., supra note 12, at 114.
168. HASEN, supra note 9, at 2.
169. Patrick Marley, Supreme Court Tensions Boil Over: Prosser Says He Was Goaded into Insulting
Chief Justice, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Mar. 19, 2011), http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/
118310479.html.
170. Id.
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public-sector employees’ collective bargaining rights.171 Although this incident
occurred after the Prosser-Kloppenberg election, it is indicative of the high level
of hostility among the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s justices.
The April 2011 contest had strong partisan overtones, occurring in the wake
of the collective bargaining bill which had recently been passed—and which would
come before the court two months later. In fact, some observers viewed this
election as a referendum on the collective bargaining reforms, which had been
enacted by the state’s Republican legislature and championed by Republican
Governor Scott Walker.172
Immediately following the April 5, 2011 election, Kloppenberg led Prosser
by just 204 votes out of approximately 1.5 million cast, with all precincts
reporting.173 These unofficial results caused Kloppenberg to declare victory.
Unfortunately for her, however, more than 14,000 votes from the City of
Brookfield had been omitted from the vote totals provided by Kathy Nickolaus,
the elected clerk of heavily Republican Waukesha County. The missing votes were
not revealed until two days after the election, when Ms. Nickolaus called a press
conference announcing that she had mistakenly omitted these votes, 10,859 of
which were for Justice Prosser—many more than enough votes to swing the result
in his favor.174 Ms. Nickolaus initially attributed the errant reporting of results to
problems with “the saving of the data,” while also saying that she was not certain
of the exact cause.175 Given that this error involved ballots that were outcome
determinative, it provoked a great deal of consternation, especially from
Kloppenberg supporters.176 Exacerbating the appearance of impropriety were
Nickolaus’s ties to Republican political circles. Before being elected Waukesha
County clerk, she had been employed for thirteen years by the State Assembly
Republicans, serving as a data analyst and computer specialist.177
The GAB immediately began an investigation, sending a team of GAB
employees to Waukesha County to investigate. In the meantime, Kloppenberg
requested a statewide recount, which ultimately showed Justice Prosser to have
won by just over 7000 votes.178 The same day the recount was requested,
Kloppenberg’s campaign manager filed a complaint with the GAB, alleging that
Nickolaus had violated state election laws, and questioning her explanation of the

171. Crocker Stephenson, Cary Spivak & Patrick Marley, Justices’ Feud Gets Physical: Prosser,
Bradley Clashed on Eve of Union Ruling, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 26, 2011, at 1A.
172. HASEN, supra note 9, at 2–3.
173. VERHOFF, supra note 78, at 2.
174. Id. at 3.
175. Id.
176. Dave Umhoefer, Kloppenburg Overplays Election Quirks, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 29,
2011, at 2A.
177. VERHOFF, supra note 78, at 4.
178. Id. at 5.
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reason for the initial discrepancy.179 This led the GAB to unanimously authorize
an independent investigation into the Waukesha County results and, specifically,
into whether Nickolaus had violated state election law.180
The GAB conducted a thorough investigation of the circumstances
surrounding the lost-then-found votes in Waukesha County. This investigation led
to a lengthy report, concluding that the likely cause was the failure to upload
Brookfield’s results into the county’s database.181 The GAB’s review team believed
that the alternative explanation that Nickolaus had provided on election night was
“not possible.”182 The GAB itself ultimately concluded that Nickolaus had
violated a state law requiring the posting of all election returns on election night,183
but also that the violation was not intentional.184 It directed Waukesha County to
develop specified procedures for future elections to avoid similar problems in the
future.185
What insights does this incident shed on the GAB? As embarrassing as the
incident was for the State of Wisconsin, it was through no fault of the GAB. The
problem, instead, was a local election official insufficiently careful in uploading
election results. In a state with 72 counties and 1851 municipalities, each with its
own clerk, there will inevitably be some who are quite competent and others who
are less so. Once the incident occurred, the GAB acted in an exemplary fashion. It
promptly sent staff to investigate, and they appear to have left no stone unturned
in trying to get to the root of the problem—analyzing election returns, reviewing
election documentation, interviewing Ms. Nickolaus, and scrutinizing the database
used by the county.186 Its investigatory process was transparent and the full report
of its results was released to the public. The GAB’s executive director identified
several areas in which further guidance from the board would be beneficial,
including the posting of election results on election night, the handling of
materials, and the correction of errors.187 The board subsequently provided
guidance in each of these areas. The incident was thus used as a means by which
to improve administrative practices, not only in Waukesha County but throughout

179. Id.
180. Id. at 6.
181. Memorandum from Kevin J. Kennedy, Dir. & Gen. Counsel, Wis. Govt. Accountability
Bd., to Members of the Wis. Gov’t Accountability Bd. 9 (Sep. 12, 2011), available at http://gab.wi
.gov/sites/default/files/news/65/gab_staff_review_report_9_12_11_pdf_17498.pdf.
182. Id.
183. WIS. STAT. § 111.84(2) (2010).
184. Joanne Kloppenburg for Justice Campaign, No. 2011-GAB-04, at *2 (Wis. Gov’t
Accountability Bd., Sept. 12, 2011) (findings and order), available at http://gab.wi.gov/sites/default/
files/news/65/findings_and_order_signed_pdf_75621.pdf.
185. Id. at 2–3; see also Letter from Thomas H. Barland, Chairperson, Wis. Gov’t
Accountability Bd., to Kathy Nickolaus (Sept. 12, 2012), available at http://gab.wi.gov/sites/default/
files/news/65/corr_to_clerk_nickolaus_9_12_11_signed_pdf_18120.pdf.
186. Kennedy, supra note 149, at 2.
187. Kennedy, supra note 155, at 10.
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the state. Whatever flaws in election administration are revealed by this incident,
they cannot fairly be laid at the GAB’s feet.
The same cannot be said of Kathy Nickolaus. The following year, she
declined to run for reelection after another snafu in reporting election results. In
April 2012, the reporting of results on election night was severely delayed, due to
problems in uploading results from memory packs into Waukesha County’s
system.188 This required Nickolaus’s staff to manually enter results for every
candidate in every contest and compare them to voting machine tapes before
posting the results. The GAB intervened and negotiated a solution with Waukesha
County officials, under which municipal clerks would report election results
directly into a new system created by the GAB.189 In addition, the Waukesha
County executive reached an agreement with Nickolaus, under which she gave up
her election night duties, handing them off to the county’s deputy clerk.190 At long
last, Waukesha County voters—and for that matter voters across the state—could
breathe a sigh of relief.
E. Recall Elections
Wisconsin’s election administration system was sorely tested by a series of
recall elections that took place in 2011 and 2012. Altogether, there were recall
elections for thirteen members of the state legislature, the governor, and lieutenant
governor in 2011 and 2012. These recall elections not only challenged the
administrative capacity of the GAB, due to the large number of petition signatures
it was required to review, but also its status as a fair and impartial actor.
The recall petitions were a direct result of the efforts of new Republican
Governor Scott Walker and the Republican majority in both houses of the state
legislature to limit public-sector employees’ collective bargaining rights. In early
2011, Wisconsin became a hotbed of activity for liberal and conservative activists
alike, as the state legislature debated the Wisconsin Budget Repair Bill.191 The bill
triggered a walkout by all fourteen Democratic members of the State Senate, who
fled the state for Illinois in order to delay the bill’s passage.192 Even before the
bill’s passage, statements of intent to initiate a recall were filed with respect to all

188. Laurel Walker, More Election Night Problems in Waukesha, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Apr.
4, 2012), http://www.jsonline.com/news/waukesha/more-election-night-problems-in-waukeshail4sbmm-146106695.html.
189. Press Release, Wis. Gov’t Accountability Bd., G.A.B. Statement Regarding New
Waukesha Cnty. Election Night Reporting Procedures 1–2 (Apr. 24, 2012), available at http://
gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files/news/65/nr_gab_statement_on_waukesha_county_election_night_11
192.pdf.
190. Laurel Walker, Under Pressure, Clerk Hands off Election Duties: Facing Potential Call for
Resignation, Nickolaus Relinquishes Power to Deputy, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 6, 2012, at 1A.
191. The bill was ultimately enacted into law as 2011 Wisconsin Act 10.
192. Bill Glauber, In Illinois, Wisconsin Senate Democrats Vow Unity, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL
(Feb. 20, 2011), http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/116581183.html.
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sixteen state senators (eight Democrats and eight Republicans) eligible for recall,
and pursued as to three Democrats (Dave Hansen, Jim Holperin, and Robert
Wirch) and six Republicans (Robert Cowles, Alberta Darling, Sheila Harsdorf,
Randy Hopper, Daniel Kapanke, and Luther Olsen). With Republicans enjoying a
nineteen to fourteen majority in the State Senate, control of that body would hinge
on the outcome of the recall elections.
Under Wisconsin law, a recall is available for all state legislators as well as for
members of the executive branch.193 It may be initiated by any citizen over
eighteen who resides in the relevant district, by filing a registration statement
including a statement of the intent to circulate a recall petition.194 For the recall to
go before voters, the petition requires signatures from twenty-five percent of
those who voted in the district in the last gubernatorial election.195 There is a sixtyday period within which to collect signatures, running from registration of the
intent to recall.196 State law also prescribes circumstances under which a signature
may not be counted, which include the failure to include the date, a date outside
the sixty day period, nonresidence in the jurisdiction, and the signatory not being
of the requisite age.197 To sign, one must be a “qualified elector” but not
necessarily registered when one signs.198 Officeholders subject to a recall are the
only ones permitted to challenge petitions; they have ten days to file a challenge
and the burden of proof is on them.199 The GAB is charged with administration
of the recall process for state officials, including the verification of petitions and
determination of the dates for recall elections in accordance with state law.200 It
has thirty-one days to determine the sufficiency of petitions and rule on their
sufficiency or insufficiency,201 at which time the recall election is scheduled for
Tuesday six weeks later.202 That determination is in turn appealable by the
officeholder or petitioner.203 In Wisconsin, officeholders subject to recall run in a
contested election against candidates from other parties, who are selected through
a primary if there is more than one seeking to run from that party.204
The GAB’s handling of the 2011 state senatorial recalls led to complaints by
both Democrats and Republicans, mostly alleging that the board was not acting
quickly enough to certify the recalls and order elections. Republican complaints
about the timing of recalls received the most attention. The board set the recall
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

WIS. STAT. § 9.10(1)(a) (2012).
Id. § 9.10(2)(d).
Id. § 9.10(1)(b).
Id. § 9.10(2)(d).
Id. § 9.10(2)(e).
See WIS. ADMIN. CODE GAB § 2.05(15)(e) (2012).
WIS. STAT. §§ 9.10(2)(g), 9.10(3)(b) (2012).
Id. § 5.05(2w).
Id. § 9.10(3)(b).
Id.
Id. § 9.10(3)(bm).
Id. § 9.10(3)(e).
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election date for the six Republican senators a week before the date for recall of
the three Democratic senators.205 The recall petitions against all nine state senators
were filed in April 2011, and all nine officeholders filed timely challenges to the
sufficiency of the signatures against them.206 The GAB scheduled hearings on all
nine challenges for late May 2011.207 It certified the recall elections for the six
Republican senators on June 3,208 but delayed decision on the Democratic
205. As it happened, the recall election for one of the Democratic senators (Hansen) wound
up taking place before the eight other recall elections, because Hansen’s Republican opponent (David
VanderLeest) did not face a primary in his bid to oppose Hansen. There was another potential
Republican candidate, John Nygren, but the GAB found him to lack the requisite number of
qualifying signatures to get on the primary ballot. As a result, VanderLeest was unopposed and no
Republican primary was necessary.
206. See Written Challenge of Senator Robert Cowles, In re Petition to Recall Senator Robert
Cowles of the 2nd Senate Dist., WGAB ID 0600011 (May 6, 2011), available at http://gab
.wi.gov/sites/default/files/Sen%20Cowles%20Challenge%20to%20Recall%20Petition.pdf; Written
Challenge of Senator Alberta Darling, In re Petition to Recall Senator Alberta Darling of the 8th
Senate Dist., WGAB ID 0600009 (May 5, 2011), available at http://gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files/
Written%20Challenge%20of%20Sen.%20Alberta%20Darling.pdf; Verified Challenge of Senator
David N. Hansen, In re Petition to Recall Senator Dave Hansen of the 30th Senate Dist., WGAB ID
0600006 (May 5, 2011), available at http://gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files/Verified%20Challenge%20
of%20Sen.%20David%20Hansen.pdf; Written Challenge of Senator Sheila Harsdorf, In re Petition to
Recall Senator Sheila Harsdorf of the 10th Senate Dist., WGAB ID 0600015 (Apr. 28, 2011), available
at http://gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files/Sen%20Harsdorf%20Challenge%20to%20Recall%20Petition
.pdf; Verified Challenge of Senator Jim Holperin, In re Petition to Recall Senator Jim Holperin of the
12th Senate Dist., WGAB ID 0600004 (May 5, 2011), available at http://gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files
/Verified%20Challenge%20of%20Sen.%20Jim%20Holperin.pdf; Written Challenge of Senator
Randy Hopper, In re Petition to Recall Senator Randy Hopper of the 18th Senate Dist., WGAB ID
0600012 (Apr. 21, 2011), available at http://gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files/Senator%20Hopper’s%20
Challenges%20to%20Petition.pdf; Written Challenge of Senator Daniel E. Kapanke, In re Petition to
Recall Senator Dan Kapanke of the 32nd Senate Dist., WGAB ID 0600016 (Apr. 15, 2011), available at
http://gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files/Sen%20Kapanke%20Challenges%20to%20Recall%20Petition.
pdf; Written Challenge of Senator Luther Olsen, In re Petition to Recall Senator Luther Olsen of the
14th Senate Dist., WGAB ID 0600010 (Apr. 28, 2011), available at http://gab.wi.gov/sites/default/
files/Sen%20Olsen%20Challenges%20to%20Petition_0.pdf; Verified Challenge of Senator Robert
Wirch, In re Petition to Recall Senator Robert Wirch of the 22nd Senate Dist., WGAB ID 0600005
(May 5, 2011), available at http://gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files/Verified%20Challenge%20of%20Sen
.%20Robert%20Wirch.pdf.
207. Memorandum from Kevin J. Kennedy, Dir & Gen. Counsel, Wis. Gov’t Accountability
Bd. & Nathaniel E. Robinson, Elections Div. Adm’r, Wis. Gov’t Accountability Bd., to Members of
the Wis. Gov’t Accountability Bd. 1 (May 23, 2011), available at http://gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files/
event/74/may_23_board_materials_10979.pdf (PDF pages 1–15).
208. KEVIN. J. KENNEDY, ST. OF WIS. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY BD., CERTIFICATE OF
SUFFICIENCY AND ORDER IN THE MATTER OF THE RECALL OF SENATOR ROBERT COWLES,
SECOND STATE SENATE DISTRICT (2011), available at http://gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files/
certificate%20suffcncy%20cowles%206.3.11.pdf; KEVIN. J. KENNEDY, ST. OF WIS. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY BD., CERTIFICATE OF SUFFICIENCY AND ORDER IN THE MATTER OF THE
RECALL OF SENATOR ALBERTA DARLING, EIGHTH STATE SENATE DISTRICT (2011), available at
http://gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files/certificate%20suffcncy%20darling%206.3.11.pdf; KEVIN. J.
KENNEDY, ST. OF WIS. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY BD., CERTIFICATE OF SUFFICIENCY AND ORDER
IN THE MATTER OF THE RECALL OF SENATOR SHEILA HARSDORF, TENTH STATE SENATE
DISTRICT (2011), available at http://gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files/certificate%20suffcncy%20
harsdorf%206.3.11.pdf; KEVIN. J. KENNEDY, ST. OF WIS. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY BD.,
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senators’ challenges.209 The GAB found the petitions to recall all three
Democratic senators sufficient on June 10, 2011, a week after it had made the
same determination with respect to the recall of the six Republican senators, and
set their recall for a week after that of the Republican senators.210
The GAB’s reason for delaying the certification of the recall of the
Democratic senators—and thus the date on which the recall could take place—
was that, while the Republican senators’ challenges involved a straightforward
legal question, the Democratic senators’ challenges raised factually complex
questions.211 Specifically, the Democrats’ challenges rested on over 200 affidavits
alleging fraudulent petition signatures, which required the board to review more
than 200,000 signatures.212 This led the GAB to seek an extension of the statutory
schedule for reviewing the recall petitions against Democratic senators, claiming
that the unanticipated complexities that these petitions entailed provided good
cause for an extension.213 Republicans cried foul, believing that the delay was
harmful to the Republican senators subject to recall and beneficial to the
Democratic senators. Republicans alleged that the board was “partisan” and
biased in favor of Democrats by virtue of the fact that all six members of the

CERTIFICATE OF SUFFICIENCY AND ORDER IN THE MATTER OF THE RECALL OF SENATOR RANDY
HOPPER, EIGHTEENTH STATE SENATE DISTRICT (2011), available at http://gab.wi.gov/sites/
default/files/certificate%20suffcncy%20hopper%206.3.11.pdf; KEVIN. J. KENNEDY, ST. OF WIS.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY BD., CERTIFICATE OF SUFFICIENCY AND ORDER IN THE MATTER OF
THE RECALL OF SENATOR DAN KAPANKE, THIRTY-SECOND STATE SENATE DISTRICT (2011),
available at http://gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files/certificate%20suffcncy%20kapanke%206.3.11.pdf;
KEVIN. J. KENNEDY, ST. OF WIS. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY BD., CERTIFICATE OF SUFFICIENCY
AND ORDER IN THE MATTER OF THE RECALL OF SENATOR LUTHER OLSEN, FOURTEENTH STATE
SENATE DISTRICT (2011), available at http://gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files/certificate%20suffcncy
%20olsen%206.3_0.pdf.
209. Patrick Marley, Review of Democrats’ Recalls Extended a Week, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
June 4, 2011, at 1B.
210. KEVIN J. KENNEDY, ST. OF WIS. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY BD., CERTIFICATE OF
SUFFICIENCY AND ORDER IN THE MATTER OF THE RECALL OF SENATOR DAVE HANSEN,
THIRTIETH STATE SENATE DISTRICT (2011), available at http://gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files/
certificate%20suffcncy%20hansen%206%2010%2011.pdf; KEVIN J. KENNEDY, ST. OF WIS. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY BD., CERTIFICATE OF SUFFICIENCY AND ORDER IN THE MATTER OF THE
RECALL OF SENATOR JIM HOLPERIN, TWELFTH STATE SENATE DISTRICT (2011) available at
http://gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files/certificate%20suffcncy%20holperin%206.10.11_0.pdf; KEVIN
J. KENNEDY, ST. OF WIS. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY BD., CERTIFICATE OF SUFFICIENCY AND
ORDER IN THE MATTER OF THE RECALL OF SENATOR ROBERT WIRCH, TWENTY-SECOND STATE
SENATE DISTRICT (2011) available at http://gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files/certificate%20suffcncy
%20wirch%206%2010%2011.pdf; see also Tom Tolan et al., Recall Elections Set for 3 Democratic Senators,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 9, 2011, at 1A.
211. Marley, supra note 209.
212. Id.
213. Notice of Motion and Motion for Additional Extension of Time to Meet Deadlines for
Good Cause Shown Under Wis. Stat. § 9.10(3)(b) at 8–13, Petitions to Recall Senators Dan Kapanke,
Randy Hopper, Luther Olsen, Dave Hansen, Sheila Harsdorf, Alberta Darling, Jim Holperin, Robert
Wirch, & Robert Cowles, No. 11-CV-1660 (Wis. Cir. Ct. June 1, 2011).
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GAB were appointed by former Democratic Governor Jim Doyle.214 This
criticism overlooked the fact that three of the GAB’s original six members were
confirmed by the Republican-controlled state assembly and that three members of
the board were former Republican elected officials.215 It also ignored the fact that
the Democrats’ challenge was more factually complicated than that of the
Republicans, which concerned a relatively simple dispute over the sufficiency of
the original registration statement,216 and that Democrats as well as Republicans
complained about the speed of certification. While the delay may have tarnished
the GAB’s standing as a nonpartisan institution in the eyes of some Republicans, it
had good reasons for delaying its determination of sufficiency as to the three
Democratic candidates.
Ultimately, a state court judge granted the GAB the extension it sought,217
and, after a nine-hour hearing, the Democrats’ challenges to the recall petitions
were rejected.218 The courts subsequently upheld the GAB’s determination that
the recall petitions were sufficient as to both the Republican and Democratic
senators.219 Two of the six recalls of Republican senators ultimately succeeded,
while all three recalls of Democratic senators failed.220 When the 2011 recall
elections were done, Republicans maintained a one-vote majority in the state
senate.221
In 2012, recalls of Governor Scott Walker, Lieutenant Governor Rebecca

214. Tolan, supra note 18.
215. Id.
216. Specifically, the Republican senators alleged that the original statement of intent to seek a
recall was insufficient, because it was filed by petitioners who failed to file the requisite registration
statement.
217. Marley, supra note 209; Press Release, Wis. Gov’t Accountability Bd., Recall Status
Update: Extensions Granted, Recalls Proceed (June 3, 2011), available at http://www.gab.wi.gov/
node/1891.
218. See ST. OF WIS. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY BD., OPEN SESSION MINUTES 1–5 (June 8,
2011), available at http://gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files/event/74/memo_board_hansen_holperin
_wirch_challenges_circul_21109.pdf; see also Tolan et al., supra note 210.
219. ST. OF WIS. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY BD., STATEMENT REGARDING DISMISSAL OF
RECALL LAWSUITS (July 8, 2011), available at http://gab.wi.gov/node/1939.
Within 7 days after an official makes a final determination of sufficiency or insufficiency of
a recall petition under par. (b), the petitioner or the officer against whom the recall petition
is filed may file a petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition with the circuit court for
the county where the recall petition is offered for filing. Upon filing of such a petition, the
only matter before the court shall be whether the recall petition is sufficient. The court
may stay the effect of the official’s order while the petition is under advisement and may
order the official to revise the election schedule contained in the order if a revised schedule
is necessitated by judicial review. Whenever the recall petitioner files a petition under this
paragraph, the officer against whom the recall petition is filed shall be a party to the
proceeding. The court shall give the matter precedence over other matters not accorded
similar precedence by law.
WIS. STAT. § 9.10(bm) (2012).
220. Tom Tolan et al., Wirch, 2 Democrats Fend Off Recall Challenges: GOP Retains 17-16 Majority,
Will Control Capitol Agenda, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Aug. 17, 2011, at 1A.
221. Id.
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Kleefish, and four additional Republican state senators (Scott Fitzgerald, Terry
Moulton, Pam Galloway, and Van Wanggard) were attempted. Because the
governor and lieutenant governor are statewide offices, the twenty-five percent
signature threshold is based upon the statewide gubernatorial vote, making the
number of signatures required several orders of magnitude greater than that for
state senators.222
The most serious challenge to the GAB’s actions during the course of these
recalls concerned the process that it was required to follow in vetting petition
signatures. As set forth above, the statute governing Wisconsin’s recall process
sets forth grounds on which a petition signature should be rejected. Those
grounds do not specifically include duplicative signatures or fictitious names.223 In
response to an inquiry from the Walker campaign, the GAB took the position that
it was not obligated to vet petition signatures for duplicates or ascertain whether a
fictitious name had been used. Instead, the GAB maintained that the responsibility
for challenging invalid signatures rested with the officeholder.224
The GAB’s position on verification prompted Walker to file a lawsuit in
Waukesha County Circuit Court, alleging that the GAB was failing to comply with
its statutory responsibilities by failing to check for duplicative signatures and
fictitious names.225 Walker’s filing of this lawsuit in a GOP stronghold was no
accident. In fact, just the previous year, the Republican legislature had enacted a
statute to allow plaintiffs to choose the venue in lawsuits of this nature.
Specifically, a 2011 statute allowed lawsuits in which the state is the sole defendant
to be filed in the county of plaintiff’s choice rather than in Dane County, the
location of the state capital Madison.226 This enabled Walker to file suit in a
county where he was more likely to find an ideologically hospitable judge.
Although the GAB protested that implementing a more rigorous verification
procedures would cost upwards of $94,000 and take up to eight extra weeks, the
circuit court judge agreed with Walker’s position, concluding that the GAB’s
process violated state law, and ordered the GAB to take reasonable steps to: (1)
identify and strike duplicative names; (2) identify and strike fictitious names; and
(3) identify and strike names where GAB could not determine that the signatory is
222. Over 540,208 valid signatures were required to recall the governor and lieutenant
governor, Recall Election Information, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY BOARD ST. OF WIS., http://gab.wi
.gov/elections-voting/recall (last visited Feb. 2, 2013), compared to between 14,958 and 16,742 for
state senators subjected to recall elections in 2012, id., and 13,537 and 20,343 for the state senators
who were subjected to recall elections in 2011. About the 2011 State Senate Recalls, GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY BOARD ST. OF WIS., http://gab.wi.gov/elections-voting/recall/2011-senate (last
visited Feb. 2, 2013).
223. See WIS. STAT. § 9.10(2)(e) (2010).
224. Complaint at 4, Friends of Scott Walker, Inc. v. Wis. Gov’t Accountability Bd., No. 11CV-4195 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dec. 15, 2011), available at http://www.wisgop.org/sites/default/files/
RPW_COMPLAINT_GAB.pdf.
225. Id. at 1–2.
226. 2011 Wisconsin Act 61, WIS. STAT. § 801.50(3) (2010).
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a qualified elector, including where addresses could not be determined.227 The
circuit court judge made this decision despite the lack of an explicit statutory
requirement that the GAB check for duplicates and fictitious names, and despite
the fact that the statute expressly places the burden of disqualifying signatures on
the officeholder. The circuit court’s decision was later reversed on other
grounds.228 Nevertheless, the GAB chose to abide by the judge’s order by
adopting a more rigorous procedure for verifying signatures.229 While the petitions
to recall the governor and lieutenant governor eventually were found to have
qualified, the more rigorous procedure required the GAB to seek a thirty-day
extension of the period for verification,230 which was later extended an additional
eleven days.231 The extra time appears to have worked to Walker’s advantage,
giving him extra time to raise money in opposition to the recall effort.232
Ultimately, the governor and lieutenant governor survived the recall, but one of
the four Republican legislators was successfully recalled, handing control of the
state senate back to Democrats in July 2012.233
It is difficult to imagine a more toxic political environment than the one
surrounding the legislative fight over collective bargaining and the subsequent
recall efforts. This type of environment would test the capacity of any state
election authority—partisan, bipartisan, or nonpartisan. The GAB did not emerge
from this episode completely unscathed. Although it is difficult to gauge the
degree of damage, there can be no question that some voters, Republicans
especially, have less confidence in the GAB than they did before. That said, there
is no good reason to question the GAB’s impartiality. Throughout the recall
process, it did as well as could be expected to conscientiously implement the law
amid challenging circumstances. It even declined to challenge a questionable
227. Friends of Scott Walker, Inc. v. Wis. Gov’t Accountability Bd., No. 11-CV-4195, at *2
(Wis. Cir. Ct. Jan. 5, 2012) (order and declaration); see also id. at *2 (order and transcript of hearing).
228. Specifically, the court of appeal found that the circuit court erred in denying intervention
to the committees to recall the governor, therefore requiring invalidation of orders made after the
erroneous denial of intervention. Friends of Scott Walker v. Brennan, 812 N.W.2d 540 (Wis. Ct. App.
Feb. 3, 2012) (unpublished table decision), available at https://www.wicourts.gov/ca/opinion/Display
Document.pdf?content=pdf&seqNo=77752.
229. See Letter from Kevin J. Kennedy, Dir. & Gen. Counsel, Wis. Gov’t Accountability Bd.,
to Members of Wis. State Senate & Assembly 1–2 (Feb. 23, 2012), available at http://gab.wi.gov/
sites/default/files/publication/65/legislative_recall_letter_2_23_12_pdf_90643.pdf.
230. Patrick Marley, Judge Doubles Time GAB Has to Review Recall Signatures, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL (Jan 25, 2012), http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/judge-doubles-time-gab-hasto-review-recall-signatures-nr3ujij-138053373.html.
231. Dee J. Hall, Judge OKs Petition Review Extension, June 5 Recall Election, WIS. STATE J. (Mar.
15, 2012), http://host.madison.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/elections/judge-oks-petition-review
-extension-june-recall-election/article_67963f84-6de3-11e1-9969-0019bb2963f4.html.
232. Steven Walters, Op-Ed., Questions in Government-by-Recall, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (May
5, 2012), http://www.jsonline.com/news/opinion/questions-in-governmentbyrecall-kb57psm-15030
5475.html.
233. Patrick Marley, Democrats Officially Take Over in Senate, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 18,
2012, at 3B.
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circuit court decision imposing duties on the GAB that went beyond those
imposed by the statute. In sum, the GAB performed admirably under extremely
difficult circumstances.
CONCLUSION
Wisconsin’s GAB is unique among state election authorities in the United
States. It is a genuinely nonpartisan institution, in an era of fierce and acrimonious
partisan competition. Although the state legislature almost unanimously approved
its creation, some members of that body undoubtedly now regret their vote. The
GAB has made decisions unpopular with elected officials in both parties. On the
subject of voter registration, the GAB initially adopted a position that displeased
some Republicans, but later adopted a fairly aggressive list maintenance policy that
some Democrats and voting rights advocates disagree with.234 It has also opposed
widespread implementation of early voting, another reform generally favored by
Democrats. In the implementation of the state’s voter identification law, the GAB
adopted a position that angered some Republicans. On the other hand, it might be
accused of failing to have acted aggressively enough in taking action against the
Waukesha County clerk, who was aligned with Republicans. Finally, in its handling
of the recall, the GAB made decisions unfavorable to both Democratic and
Republican officeholders, although it has taken more heat from the right side of
the aisle.
Taken as a whole, the GAB’s decisions in the area of election administration
have not favored either major party. Both have at times been satisfied and at times
dissatisfied by the GAB’s actions. But in the end, that sort of balance should not
be the guiding star by which its work is evaluated. Instead, the question is whether
it has fairly and evenhandedly interpreted and implemented the elections laws it is
charged with implementing. In that respect, the GAB has performed splendidly.
While some might reasonably disagree with some of its decisions on the merits, its
decision-making process has been meticulous, careful, balanced, and judicious.
The GAB thus serves as a worthy model for the remaining forty-nine states, all of
which still have partisan or bipartisan chief election authorities—despite the
emerging international consensus that independence from partisan politics is
essential to proper election administration.
What remains to be seen is whether a nonpartisan model like GAB can
succeed in the long term, given our hyperpolarized political climate which shows
no sign of abating. Already, the GAB has seen some attempts to undermine its
authority, most notably by requiring that its rules implementing voter ID receive
234. See Letter from Robert F. Bauer, Gen. Counsel, Obama for Am., to Kevin J. Kennedy,
Dir. & Gen. Counsel, Wis. Gov’t Accountability Bd. 3 (Aug. 25, 2008), available at http://moritzlaw
.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/VanHollen-Motion-9-16-08.pdf (exhibit A) (referring to
the “Ping” letter process relating to undeliverable mailings authorized under section 6.32 of the
Wisconsin Statutes as being “exceptionally aggressive”).
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the approval of the governor. This is worrisome, given the importance of
insulating election authorities from partisan pressure. On the other hand, the GAB
was successful in resisting partisan pressures during its first five years. Although
the board is sure to face more attacks from partisans in the future, its ability to
maintain its independence in the face of contentious policy debates may ultimately
generate public support for the institution, providing a strong disincentive for
elected officials to interfere with its decision making.
The GAB’s experience therefore provides a ray of hope for those of us who
believe that the United States should move away from its partisan system of
election administration, which has proven so problematic in the years since the
2000 election. The conflicts of interest inherent in the dominant U.S. model make
it unsuitable for a country that aspires to be the standard-bearer for democracy
around the world. Those looking for an alternative should consider Wisconsin’s
model.

